vinemaple

David Brooks shares his strategy on Iraq:

Krepinevich's proposal is hardly new. He's merely describing a classic counterinsurgency strategy, which was used, among other places, in Malaya by the British in the 1950's. The same approach was pushed by Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt in a Washington Post essay back on Oct. 26, 2003; by Kenneth Pollack in Senate testimony this July 18; and by dozens of midlevel Army and Marine Corps officers in Iraq.

Krepinevich calls the approach the oil-spot strategy. The core insight is that you can't win a war like this by going off on search and destroy missions trying to kill insurgents. There are always more enemy fighters waiting. You end up going back to the same towns again and again, because the insurgents just pop up after you've left and kill anybody who helped you. You alienate civilians, who are the key to success, with your heavy-handed raids.

Instead of trying to kill insurgents, Krepinevich argues, it's more important to protect civilians. You set up safe havens where you can establish good security. Because you don't have enough manpower to do this everywhere at once, you select a few key cities and take control. Then you slowly expand the size of your safe havens, like an oil spot spreading across the pavement.

Two and a half years into this and now we're supposed to decide what our strategy is? Sheesh. Oh, and the strategy calls for many more soldiers. Where are they supposed to come from? We're out of reservists and regular military recruiting is down. This new strategy also requires a President who can admit mistakes. Short of an impeachment, that's not going to happen for another three and a half years.

Here's a hint: Britain didn't establish permanent bases in Malaysia. They made it clear they were on the way out. That's what this war is really about -- whether or not the U.S. has permanent bases in Iraq. That's why Bush always refuses to say under what conditions American soldiers can leave Iraq.